

































Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence
 
Peter Stella and Åke Lonnberg 
 
Working Paper 2008-13 
May 2008  
 
 
The authors thank Claudia Jadrijevic for excellent research assistance. They also thank Alejandra Naughton, Ulrich Klüh, 
Jerome Vandenbussche, Christopher Sims, and other participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s conference, Fiscal 
Policy and Monetary/Fiscal Policy Interactions, held April 19–20, 2007, for comments. The views expressed here are the authors’ 
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Any remaining errors are the 
authors’ responsibility. 
 
Please address questions regarding content to Peter Stella, Division Chief, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, 
International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20431, 202-623-5889, pstella@imf.org, or Åke Lonnberg, 
Senior Financial Sector Expert, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20431, 202-623-5331, alonnberg@imf.org. 
 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working papers, including revised versions, are available on the Atlanta Fed’s Web site at 
www.frbatlanta.org. Click “Publications” and then “Working Papers.” Use the WebScriber Service (at www.frbatlanta.org) to 
receive e-mail notifications about new papers. 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ATLANTA       WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence 
 
Peter Stella and Åke Lonnberg 
 
Working Paper 2008-13 
May 2008 
 
Abstract: Conventional economic policy models focus only on selected elements of the central bank 
balance sheet, in particular monetary liabilities and sometimes foreign reserves. The canonical model of 
an “independent” central bank assumes that it chooses money (or an interest rate) unconstrained by a 
need to generate seignorage for itself or the government. Whereas a long line of literature has emphasized 
the dangers of fiscal dominance influencing the conduct of monetary policy, this paper considers the 
relatively novel idea that an independent central bank could be constrained in achieving its policy 
objectives by its own balance sheet situation. If one accepts this potential constraint as a valid concern, 
the financial strength of the central bank as a stand-alone entity becomes highly relevant for ascertaining 
monetary policy credibility. We consider several strands of evidence that clearly indicate fiscal backing for 
central banks cannot be assumed, and hence financial independence is relevant to operational 
independence. First, we examine 135 central bank laws to illustrate the variety of legal approaches 
adopted with respect to central bank financial independence. Second, we examine the same data set with 
regard to central bank recapitalization provisions to show that even in cases where the treasury is 
nominally responsible for keeping the central bank financially strong, it may do so in purely a cosmetic 
fashion. Third, we show that, in actual practice, treasuries have frequently not provided central banks 
with genuine financial support on a timely basis, leaving them excessively reliant on seignorage to finance 
their operations or forcing them to abandon policy objectives.  
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ISSUES IN CENTRAL BANK FINANCE AND INDEPENDENCE 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses several issues in what might be termed “central bank finance.” A 
particular focus is placed on the financial structure of the central bank balance sheet and the 
legal and institutional arrangements shaping central bank and government financial relations. 
The importance of those relations for central bank financial independence is stressed. 
 
It would appear that the corporate financial structure of central banks has received little 
explicit attention in recent decades apart from the debate surrounding the establishment of 
the European Central Bank. The index of Stiglitz’s textbook “Economics of the Public 
Sector” (second edition) yields but one reference to “central bank” in a footnote on page 26 
to the discussion of how to define the public sector. The index of Tirole’s “The Theory of 
Corporate Finance” yields no mention of central banks. 
 
This neglect of central bank corporate finance may be attributed to several factors which 
have led to the view that central bank finances can be ignored as they are either: 
macroeconomically insignificant; properly analyzed only within the consolidated public 
sector accounts; or irrelevant owing to the central bank’s unlimited ability to create money. 
Each of these factors will be considered in turn in this paper as the views based on them 
underpin the dominant tendency to model the independent monetary policy process as the 
choice of either a money supply or interest rate unconstrained by any requirement that the 
central bank intertemporal budget constraint be met. This last assumption we have found in 
many countries to be highly problematic. 
 
The view taken in this paper is that it is necessary to evaluate the corporate financial structure 
of the central bank as a stand-alone entity, particularly when one is evaluating the monetary 
policy credibility of an independent central bank.
2 That said, for other purposes it is 
appropriate for the state’s consolidated budget and balance sheet to be the focus of attention 
                                                 
2 By independent here we mean neither constrained to pay specific dividends to government nor the recipient of 
automatic treasury coverage of losses.  2   
and hence the assets and liabilities, as well as the income statement of the central bank are 
appropriately amalgamated with the fiscal accounts. For example, in evaluating sovereign 
debt sustainability or the overall fiscal stance, consolidating the operations and balance sheet 
of the treasury and central bank can be essential.
3  
 
These views are controversial, however, as is the substance of the concept of central bank 
financial independence. The controversy is reviewed in Section III of this paper. In Section II 
we will discuss why there has been increasing interest in central bank finance in recent years; 
Section IV considers the results of a review of legal provisions pertaining to these questions; 
while Section V asks whether treasuries provide financial support to central banks in 
practice. Section VI provides some ideas as to how financial independence can be 
safeguarded. 
 
II.   THE INCREASING RELEVANCE OF CENTRAL BANK FINANCIAL STRENGTH AND 
INDEPENDENCE 
In part, the impression that central bank finance is a new concept is illusory and reflects a 
certain innocence or ignorance in certain parts of the world where central banks have been 
habitually quite profitable and either seemingly financially unconstrained (in a fiat money 
world) or subject to strict limits on the nature of their balance sheets (under metallic 
standards). Part of the failure to see the relevance of central bank financial strength is clearly 
related to the situation in most countries where economic textbooks have been written and 
published. The U.S. Federal Reserve system has made a profit every year since 1915. De 
Nederlandsche Bank has made a profit every year save one since 1814. Walter Bagehot, in 
his classic “Lombard Street,” wrote “Of the ultimate solvency of the Bank of England, or of 
the eventual safety of its vast capital, even at the worst periods of its history, there has not 
been the least doubt” (page 208, 14
th ed., 1873). Recent institutional arrangements in the 
United Kingdom which ensure that the Treasury underwrites the risk attending emergency 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Robinson and Stella (1987) and IMF (2002).  3   
lending—such as has been the case with Northern Rock as in September 2007—provide even 
greater assurance of the Bank of England’s financial position. 
 
However, in other parts of the world, central bank financial problems have been quite 
prominent for decades, in particular, those difficult situations where central bank financial 
structures have been debilitated by quasi-fiscal operations. Central banks have been unable to 
meet their most basic functions—including supply of banknotes—owing to financial distress; 
have changed policy in order to reduce losses; and, in at least one case, the Philippines, have 
been placed into liquidation. 
 
In a number of cases, the root of long-standing problems has been the provision of credit to 
ailing banking systems and the respective central banks’ subsequent attempts to issue debt to 
control their immediate macroeconomic consequences.
4 In those situations, central banks 
have found themselves financially weakened (abandoned rather than independent)—and 
highly constrained in terms of policy options—whatever the legal or theoretical 
considerations that suggest that they should have been supported by treasuries. As the current 
president of the Central Bank of Costa Rica has said “We, the central bank, have a negative 
net worth...and this remains our greatest challenge.”
5 
 
More recently, concerns have been raised about (potential) financial difficulties being 
registered by advanced country central banks—and in central banks in important emerging 
financial markets.
6 Here it is useful to separate the recognition of financial losses and the 
actual causes of the losses. 
 
Regarding the recognition of financial losses, the general movement toward greater financial 
transparency in central bank financial accounts has been apparent over the past 15 years.
7 
                                                 
4 A good recent example is the Dominican Republic. See http://www.bancentral.gov.do/actividades.asp?a=bc2006-11-08 
5 Francisco de Paula Gutierrez, as interviewed in Central Banking, Vol. XV, No. 4, May 2005, page 82. 
6 For example, BusinessWeek online (2003).  
7 See Stella (2008b).  4   
This has been accompanied by improved clarity in world accounting standards for 
corporations in general. Of particular relevance in this respect is the gradual adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for corporates, which has spread to 
certain central banks. 
 
A key element of IFRS is the requirement that foreign exchange revaluation changes be 
brought to the profit and loss account of the entity in question. As most central banks—as an 
essential element of their institutional roles—have large net exposures to foreign currencies, 
the adoption of IFRS brings with it the possibility of volatile income and balance sheet 
statements. Even in those countries where IFRS has not been adopted, there has been a 
worldwide trend to adopt mark-to-market and/or fair value accounting for assets and 
liabilities. Thus central banks which previously might have revalued their assets infrequently 
or at arbitrary values, are increasingly recognizing asset price volatility. 
 
Whereas in the past, central banks might have set aside revaluation losses and/or 
accumulated losses in opaque asset accounts, they are now more likely to reflect these losses 
in the profit and loss accounts and in equity. Thus the risks coming from heightened exposure 
in particular to foreign exchange revaluation losses have become more apparent. The 
combination of this trend with mechanical rules for distribution of central bank profit that 
were designed for a less volatile environment raises an important corporate finance issue that 
will be touched upon later. 
 
Apart from the increased recognition of volatility, central banks have become more exposed to 
volatility and under increased profit pressures. Volatility has risen as central banks have 
accumulated large volumes of foreign exchange reserves, in absolute terms and as a 
proportion of their assets. This has been the case particularly in countries experiencing current 
and capital account surpluses—energy exporters and high real growth exporters in Asia. This 
increase in the exposure of central banks to exchange rate volatility has been noted both by  5   
researchers and the financial press
8. This accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has 
exposed those central banks both to potential revaluation losses were their currencies to 
appreciate against the major international reserve currencies and to cash flow losses. The cash 
flow losses result from the issuance of central bank debt to sterilize the local currency 
counterpart of foreign exchange purchases when exchange rate appreciation has been resisted. 
The global rise in the magnitude of capital flows, in relation to the size of central bank balance 
sheets, has increased central bank balance sheet leverage. These factors have contributed to a 
rise in the risks inherent in the balance sheet and consequently to a rise in the risk that central 
bank capital—as conventionally defined—may be exhausted. (See Figures 1 and 2) 
 
Figure 1. Ratio of  Net Foreign Assets to Central Bank Capital
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   Source: International Financial Statistics 
                                                 
8 See The Economist (2005). Sims (2003a) points out the higher relative exposure to foreign exchange 
revaluations of the ECB compared to the U.S. Federal Reserve. Stella (1997) suggests that the (then) capital 
policy of the Bank of Norway arose to shield capital from this volatility.  6   
 
Another factor behind the concern regarding central bank finances has been a global decline in 
inflation and consequently declining central bank income from the inflation tax
9. With a 
reduction in the quantity of non-interest bearing money, lower inflation, and rising foreign 
exchange sterilization costs and revaluation risks, the prospects of central bank losses have 
increased. Somewhat preceding this decline in inflation in many countries has been a 
reduction in the quantity of unremunerated reserve requirements and lessened taxation of the 
financial system. Globalization of capital flows has played a part in this, beginning in the 
1970s with the development of the Eurodollar market largely motivated by the desire to avoid 
restrictive U.S. regulations. This enhanced competition for U.S. domiciled banking activity 
eventually was met with reduced regulation. The globalization of currencies and ease of cross-
border financial transactions is now a world wide phenomenon. Indeed the spread of 
sophisticated financial products and enhanced technological capacity to transfer funds across 
                                                 
9 The global decline in inflation has undoubtedly slowed the erosion of central bank seigniorage (i.e., income 
from the monetary base at zero inflation) caused by technological innovation away from the use of cash and 
unremunerated balances at central banks, but this has not been sufficient to reverse the clear overall trend. 


























 Source: International Financial Statistics 7   
borders is seen by some to be the root cause for the worldwide decline in inflation.
10 Thus the 
capacity of the central bank to impose taxes on its regulated financial sector has been reduced. 
 
There has been a global trend of increased central bank corporate leverage and risk, 
potentially larger contingent liabilities arising from growth in domestic and international 
financial markets coupled with the central bank’s role in providing lender of last resort 
financing, rising sterilization expenditures, and declining income. Evidence of the magnitude 
of the last factor is provided in Figure 3 below. 
 























             1/   Countries with less than 3 observations in each subperiod were eliminated from the sample. 
             Source: Calculations with data from Bankscope. 
 
Examining the median is intended to provide a global overview of trends and clearly masks 
different situations in different countries. Perhaps the most prominent case of recent concern 
has been that of Japan where the deflation problem reached its most profound level since the 
Great Depression era.
11 In other countries the situation remains quite comfortable but the 
trend is also evident in Figures 4 and 5. 
                                                 
10 See Kroszner (2006). 
11 See Goodfriend (1994), Olivier and Svensson (2004), Okina (1999), Cargill (2005),  Sims (2003a).  8   
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                   Source:  Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, various issues. 
 
Figure 5. Bank of Canada 
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                1/  Includes C$5 million in capital and C$25 million in the "Rest Fund." 
                Source:  Bank of Canada, Annual Report, various issues. 
 
The last explanation for the increased attention being paid to central bank finances is simply 
that it is a by-product of the increased attention being given central bank independence in 
general during the last two decades. A particularly prominent example of this is the 
delineation by the European Union of financial independence as one of the key components 
of central bank independence. The creation of the European Central Bank led to considerable  9   




The European Union, through the European Monetary Institute (the precursor to the 
European Central Bank) has stressed the importance of central bank financial independence 
as an element in overall independence.
13 That this issue is taken seriously can be seen in the 
determination by the Commission of the European Communities that Swedish legislation in 
2002 “…is assessed not to be compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statue”
14 and in the 
Opinion of the European Central Bank expressed on proposed government amendments to 
the Suomen Pankki Act (Finland’s central bank).
15 In both cases, the fiscal relationship 
between the State and the central bank was not deemed sufficiently well-defined to ensure 
that the central bank would always have adequate financial resources to meet its obligation 
under the Treaty. 
 
III.   IS CENTRAL BANK FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE A SENSIBLE CONCEPT? 
A.   Technical Insolvency vs. Policy Insolvency 
The point of analyzing financial issues as they pertain to central banks is not with a view to 
assessing profitability. The graphics provided in Section II are useful as indicators of central 
bank financial stress, but they are not particularly useful unless they have some correlation 
with policy performance. The preliminary econometric evidence suggests that central bank 
                                                 
12 See Legal Aspects of the European System of Central Banks, ed. Amicorum and Zamboni Garavelli, 
European Central Bank. 
13 EMI (1998) “Convergence report” if an NCB (national central bank) is fully independent from an institutional 
and functional point of view, but at the same time unable to avail itself autonomously of the appropriate 
economic means to fulfill its mandate, its overall independence would nevertheless be undermined. In the 
EMI’s opinion, NCBs should be in a position to avail themselves of the appropriate means to ensure that their 
ESCB-related (European System of Central Banks) tasks can be properly fulfilled. Page 295. 
14 European Monetary Institute, 2002, Convergence Report, (Frankfurt). www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/conrep/cr2002en.pdf 
 
15 European Central Bank, 15 October 2003 (CON/2003/22) and 20 January 2004 (CON/2004/1).  10   
financial strength is so correlated.
16 Supportive evidence is also available in numerous case 
studies. 
 
However, there are important voices suggesting that the concept itself—central bank 
financial strength—is not sensible. Either because a central bank—having the power to create 
money—need not worry about its financial situation and/or the treasury will always stand 
behind it with its capacity to tax. 
 
A particularly cynical view is that the treasury always controls central bank finances, 
whatever the law or practice might suggest. Hence the “integrated public finance” view is 
valid always and everywhere. Buiter (2006) argues that although a central bank may be able 
to resist, for a time, attempts by the treasury to appropriate its assets, ‘Ultimately, a 
determined treasury will be able to overcome such obstacles, be they conventions, laws or 




The view that central bank and treasury finances are inextricably intertwined appears 
prevalent in U.S. official circles. For example, Alan Greenspan has remarked, “When there is 
confidence in the integrity of government, monetary authorities—the central bank and the 
finance ministry—can issue unlimited claims denominated in their own currencies and can 
guarantee or stand ready to guarantee the obligation of private issuers as they see fit…. 
Central banks can issue currency, a non-interest-bearing claim on the government, 
effectively without limit. They can discount loans and other assets of banks or other private 
depository institutions, thereby converting potentially illiquid private assets into risk less 
claims on the government in the form of deposits at the central bank. That all of these claims 
on government are readily accepted reflects the fact that a government cannot become 
                                                 
16 See Ize (2006), Stella (2008b), and Klüh and Stella (2008), forthcoming. 
17 While we agree with this statement, we do not agree with the notion that in situations where there is, or has 
been, political support for central bank independence, laws, institutional arrangements and central bank 
financial strength are irrelevant for credibility and policy outcomes during a meaningful time horizon. In the 
long run, of course, all laws, arrangements and constitutions can be modified.  11   
insolvent with respect to obligations in its own currency. A fiat money system, like the 
monies we have today, can produce such claims without limit.”
18 (Emphasis added) 
 
This is quite an unequivocal and strong form of the integrated central bank and government 
view. Both currency and deposits at the central bank—the entire monetary base—are 
considered to be the direct liability of the government. 
 
A different perspective—but arriving at the same conclusion that the central bank’s financial 
situation should not be a cause for concern—is found in a statement of Laurence H. Meyer 
before a U.S. congressional committee: “Creditors of central banks however are at no risk of 
a loss because the central bank can always create additional currency to meet any obligation 
denominated in that currency.”
19 
 
A third view, coming from a still different perspective was expressed by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office after assessing the appropriate level of Federal Reserve System capital: 
“We found no widely accepted, analytically based criteria to show whether a central bank 




These statements raise a number of interesting issues, the most important of which is not 
whether the government/central bank can meet its temporary liquidity requirements in local 
currency but whether other government commitments would be violated—in real terms—
were the central bank to exercise its power, i.e., create enough money to meet all of its (and 
government’s) securitized and monetary obligations. 
 
                                                 
18 See Greenspan (1997).  
 
19 Statement of Laurence H. Meyer, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Committee 
on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, May 3, 2000, page 7. 
 
20 U.S. General Accounting Office (2002).  12   
Viewed as an integrated whole, the point, as Sims (2003b) has shown, is that there are clear 
limits to a government’s, and central bank’s, ability to commit to an inflation target in the 
absence of a fiscal anchor.
21 From the viewpoint of an independent central bank the point is 
that the actions necessary to avoid its own financial default circumscribe the strength of the 
policy outcome the central bank can orchestrate—even supposing it has no financial 
commitment to its shareholder(s) and no domestic currency liquidity constraint.
22 Thus the 
interesting focus of analysis is not whether the central bank can avoid technical insolvency 
but whether the central bank can meet its policy commitments given its financial situation.
23 
 
This distinction between technical insolvency and policy “bankruptcy” can be traced back a 
considerable time. As cited above, Bagehot (1873) argues essentially that no one even 
dreams the Bank of England could be insolvent. But later in the book he notes that the Bank 
of England’s Banking Department had failed three times. How to reconcile this with the 
safety of the capital? The answer lies in the power of the government to change or suspend 
the law governing the conversion of Bank of England obligations into specie (gold or silver 
coins or bullion). Thus the Parliament’s ability and willingness to suspend the law, not the 
Bank’s ability to create claims, is what protected the Bank’s capital. Which brings us back to 
the original point, that if the ultimate policy goal was to maintain convertibility and liquidity 
in the market, had not the Bank failed, even though, with the suspension of conversion, its 
capital was preserved? 
 
B.   Policy Insolvency—Does the Central Bank Balance Sheet Alone Matter? 
If we accept that policy insolvency is the more relevant concept this does not necessarily 
imply that the central bank financial situation—independently—is worth analyzing. Indeed, 
the question posed above, in the integrated view, would likely be answered in the negative. 
That is, were the central bank to arrive at a situation where its policy decisions were being 
impacted by its financial condition, the treasury would, could, or should always assist. 
                                                 
21 Sims (2003b). 
22 Ize (2005) provides an insightful discussion of the situation facing the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
23 See Stella (1997).  13   
 
Goodhart (1999) outlines the view that the central bank balance sheet does not matter and it 
is noteworthy that—in a fiat money environment—he emphasizes the importance of the 
financial backing of the state to achieve central bank objectives, not the ability of the state to 
renege on its commitments. “CBs in some countries, mainly in Latin America, have actually 
become technically insolvent (using generally accepted accounting principles) as a result of 
losses incurred on loans in support of the domestic financial system. But such insolvency 
does not make much difference because what stands behind the liabilities of the CB is not the 
capital of the CB but the strength and taxing power of the State.”
24 
 
Buiter states this view even more forcefully. “The concept of a financially independent 
central bank is therefore, in substance, vacuous, whatever the formal legal status of the 
central bank…. First the inflation target has to be financeable by the state, that is, the 
consolidated central bank and government. Second, when monetary policy is institutionally 
delegated to the central bank, the treasury has to ‘stand behind’ the central bank.”
25 
 
However, for a number of countries, this is not a valid assumption and such a distinction 
between monetary regimes—there are those where the state explicitly or implicitly stands 
behind the central bank and those where it does not—is the essential starting point for the 
analysis in Sims (2003a). The following two sections of this paper discuss the international 
experience on this point from first a legal then empirical/historical perspective. 
 
C.   A Digression: Are Central Bank Finances of Macroeconomic Importance? 
In discussing the financial situation of the Federal Reserve System, the Bank of Canada or 
the European Central Bank, the magnitudes would seem worthy of no more than a footnote to 
the general fiscal accounts. Fed profits average about ¼ of one percent of GDP and the 
profits/losses of the European Central Bank, during its brief existence, have remained less 
                                                 
24 Charles A. E. Goodhart, Myths about the Lender of Last Resort, International Finance 2:3, 1999, page 348). 
25 How Robust is the New Conventional Wisdom in Monetary Policy? Willem H. Buiter, paper presented at the 
2006 Central Bank Governors’ Symposium ‘Challenges to Monetary Theory’, (Bank of England) June 23.  14   
than 0.03 percent of Euro-area GDP in absolute value. Threats to central bank financial 
independence could well seem extremely speculative in many countries. Within a 
“reasonable” range of observed situations in mature industrial country central banks, the 
disturbances to the local equilibrium wherein resides central bank financial strength are 
hardly enough to lead anyone to question whether they will impact policy objectives. 
 
If the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank were to experience minor perturbations 
in the strength of their balance sheets, fiat money could cover them either immediately or 
through the retention of future seignorage. But it is dangerous to extrapolate too far from the 
local equilibrium when experience is no guide. 
 
Goodfriend (1994) has noted that Congress does have the power to reduce Fed surplus and 
that “If carried far enough, stripping the Fed of its liquid assets would obviously interfere 
with its ability to conduct monetary and credit policy. Equally important, however, it would 
undermine the Fed’s financial independence by denying it enough interest income to finance 




The financial status of the Bank of Japan has been the subject of rather intense debate in 
recent years particularly owing to the balance sheet risk it has undertaken as part of its 
quantitative easing policy associated with prolonged deflation. In Latin America, Asia, 
Africa, and in Eastern and Central Europe, central banks have found themselves in 
considerable financial distress, usually owing to the delayed impact of quasi-fiscal 
operations—often in direct relation to the provision of credit in situations of a systemic 
banking crisis.  
 
The prolonged impact of such operations in certain countries can be seen in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
26 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 26, No. 3 (August 1994, part 2).  15   
Table 1. Central Bank Results in a Group of Western Hemisphere Countries, 
1987–2005 
 
Country  1987 1988  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Argentina  -0.7  -0.5 -4.5  -0.7  -0.4  -0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3  -0.1 3.8 0.2 0.8 1.0 
Bolivia  1/  ...  -0.2 -0.4  -0.7  -0.7  -0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Chile  -3.1 -3.2  -1.8 -2.2 -1.1 -1.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.6 -0.7 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.4 -1.0 -1.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.5 
Costa  Rica  1/ -3.5 -3.3  -2.8 -2.0 -1.9 -2.0 -1.5 -1.4 -1.9 -2.1 -1.8 -1.6 -1.6 -1.8 -1.2 -1.4 -1.6 -1.3 -1.4 
Dominican  
   Republic  -1.0 -1.5  -0.8 -0.6  0.0 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -2.6 -4.0 -2.9 
Ecuador  ...  -2.2 -2.5  -2.9  -2.3  -1.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3  -1.2  ...0.6  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Guatemala  2/ -1.6 -1.9  -1.5 -2.4 -1.6 -1.2 -1.1 -1.3 -1.0 -1.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 
Haiti  ... ...  ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...  0.1  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.6  -1.0 ... 
Honduras  1/  ...  ...  ... -3.2 -2.5 -2.7 -0.5 -1.3 -1.9 -1.6 -1.6 -0.1 -0.2  0.0 -0.4 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 
Jamaica  3/  -5.7 -5.4  -5.4 -5.0 -4.3 -5.6 -4.7 -1.8 -2.0  0.6  1.0 -0.3  0.0  0.3 -0.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.0 -1.5 
Nicaragua  -5.0 -8.0  -13.8 -2.8 -0.7 -1.1 -1.4 -0.6  0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -3.3 -1.7 -1.6 -1.3 -2.0 -1.6 -1.4  ... 
Paraguay  1/  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.8  0.5  0.1  0.0 -3.8 -1.5 -1.8 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4 -1.3 -1.4 -1.1 -0.8 -0.2 
Peru  1/  -5.4  -3.2 -0.4  -1.1  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0  -0.1 
Uruguay  -2.8 -3.1  -3.4 -3.6 -2.2 -1.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3  0.0 -0.6  ... 
Venezuela  -1.4 -2.9  -1.8 -2.0 -1.7  0.0 -0.2 -2.0 -1.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.8 -0.5  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.8  1.6  ... 
Mean  -2.7 -2.7  -3.0 -2.0 -1.4 -1.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -1.0 
Median  -2.8 -2.9  -1.8 -2.1 -1.4 -1.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 
 
   Sources: Leone (1994); IMF staff reports; Central Bank of Argentina; Central Bank of Guatemala; Central Bank of Paraguay; Central Bank of Uruguay; and Central Bank of Venezuela. 
 
   1/ Numbers for 2005 are preliminary. 
   2/ Number for 2005 is IMF staff estimate. 
   3/ For years after 2002, only includes Bank of Jamaica cash losses, excluding Bank of Jamaica Special Issue Bond. 
 
 
In Uruguay, central bank losses averaged 3 percent of GDP in the late 1980s. The central 
banks of Chile and Guatemala have made losses for close to two decades consecutively. 
Venezuela made losses for 12 out of 13 consecutive years, Uruguay made losses for 14 
consecutive years, Jamaica 9. 
 
Losses frequently arise when, to borrow from Buiter’s terminology, in the midst of a banking 
crisis the central bank with its “short-term deep pockets” provides risk-laden credit and 
thereafter hopes to be recapitalized by “The treasury, the agency of the state with the capacity 
to tax [with] long-term deep pockets.”
27 This effect can be seen in a number of countries 
during the 1980s and subsequent spikes in the data more recently—for example, the 
Dominican Republic in 2003–05.
28 
 
From a theoretical perspective Sims (2003a) notes that in general equilibrium models—
“..uniqueness and stability of the price level depends on beliefs of the public about how the 
system would react in the face of extreme circumstances like very high inflation, severe 
                                                 
27 Buiter (2006) “How Robust is the New Conventional Wisdom in Monetary Policy?” Page 44. 
28 Unfortunately, obscure accounting treatments have often led to a delayed recognition of losses. See 
Stella (2002).  16   
financial instability, or deflations in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is 
approached.”
29 That is, under stress, the expectations of the public as to how the central bank 
will respond to an extreme deterioration in its financial position will determine the 
effectiveness of macroeconomic stabilization efforts.
30 
 
In reality, many countries have found themselves in “extreme circumstances” and their 
experience suggests that neither the Fed nor the ECB situations are representative of the 
issues facing a number of developing or emerging market central banks on a daily basis. 
 
In the Dominican Republic, following efforts to contain the liquidity expansion following the 
recent banking crisis, central bank domestic debt amounts to 22 times central government 
domestic debt. In Costa Rica, the central bank has made losses for over two decades 
consecutively as the structure of the balance sheet reveals a huge imbalance among interest 
bearing liabilities and interest earning assets.
31 Periodic partial recapitalizations have not been 
sufficient to reverse the overall trend. 
 
The negative equity problem of the Central Bank of Chile can be traced back to the financial 
crisis of 1982 the cost of which has been estimated at 33 percent of GDP. Initially the cost 
was borne entirely by the central bank but in 1987 the government made a partial 
recapitalization. This issue was not faced again until 2006 when the Congress approved a 
transfer of up to 0.5 percent of GDP per annum for a period of 5 years. The central bank has 
estimated that this capital infusion would advance the date at which it would have positive 
equity from 2041 to 2026, that is, by fifteen years. The central bank received US$606 million 
as the first part of this partial recapitalization on December 27, 2006. 
 
In Honduras and Nicaragua the ratios of central bank domestic debt to central government 
domestic debt are 2.4, and 1.4, respectively. During a one year period—August 2000 to 
                                                 
29 Sims (2003a) Fiscal Aspects of Central Bank Independence, page 3. 
30 See JPMorgan. Japan Markets Outlook and Strategy, January 24, 2002. 
31 See Ize (2005).  17   
2001—the Central Bank of Nicaragua issued 20 percent of GDP in dollar-indexed domestic 
debt to resolve four bank failures. These bonds subsequently had to be restructured in an 
agreement with the private sector holders. Monetary stabilization bonds account for 
57 percent of the liabilities of the Central Bank of Korea (end-2005); Bank Indonesia 
certificates 19 percent, and Bank of Jamaica certificates of deposit 61 percent. 
  
In a number of countries it can safely be said that the central bank is both the manager and 
obligor of the sovereign’s domestic debt. In those cases the conflict of interest that is usually 
present between the government and central bank—raising interest rates to influence 
inflation leads to higher sovereign debt service cost (at least in the short run)—is observed 
within a single institution. 
  
The central bank as debt issuer also raises governance problems. In particular, while 
government debt issues are usually subject to legislative approval, debt issues by central 
banks may not be so constrained.
32 Here the implicit nature of government backing may 
allow the central bank to issue in its own name under the general securities law of the 
country. Operational links with banks—frequently the largest holder of domestic government 
debt—facilitate marketing and establishing the infrastructure (if no market already exists) as 
well as potentially compounds the governance issue. Furthermore, in many countries that 
have witnessed a sharp rise in domestic debt it has been precisely the provision of large 
amounts of central bank securities to an insolvent banking system which has enabled the 
rapid but often illusory “deepening” of the market. The banking system—which may also be 
regulated by the central bank—then becomes dependent for its survival on the full and timely 
service by the central bank of their largest single performing asset. 
 
These are a few examples of central banks who have been constrained in their operations 
following what might be classified as a heavy engagement in quasi-fiscal operations. The fact 
that such operations usually take place in the context of government fiscal distress suggests 
                                                 
32 Sims (1999) discusses the interesting case of Grover Cleveland’s issuance of debt for essentially monetary 
policy purposes without consulting Congress.  18   
why it is particularly innocent to assume that government will “stand behind” the central 
bank in a timely way to ensure that policy commitments are met. The power to tax, often 
cited as the ultimate guarantor of the currency, is unlikely to be employed precisely during 
those extreme circumstances when the central bank would require backing for its operations. 
Indeed, it is precisely during those circumstances that the inflation tax is seen as an efficient 
tool and price stability a dispensable luxury. Experiences worldwide suggest that Buiter’s 
treasury’s “deep long pockets” may be quite deep and in the end—or at least during a very 
material time frame—potentially empty. 
 
IV.   LEGAL PROVISIONS 
A.   Explicit Recognition of Responsibilities 
The first issue to be considered here is whether in legislation pertaining to the central bank 
there are provisions noting whether the government is in some sense responsible for the 
central bank’s financial liabilities and vice versa. We examine this in two ways. First, among 
the general provisions in the legislation treating relations with the fiscal authorities, second in 
those sections of the law that deal with the financial structure of the central bank and how 
capital deficiencies would be resolved. The findings, based on a review of 135 central bank 
laws, are summarized in Appendix 1 (Table 4) below. 
 
Appendix 1 shows that there is a diversity of legal views world wide with, in particular, a 
diametrically opposed bi-model distribution. Examples supporting the views expressed by 
Greenspan, Lindsey, Goodhart and Buiter, which suggest that the treasury stands behind the 
central bank include El Salvador: “All the obligations of the Central Reserve Bank of El 
Salvador shall be assumed by the State through the Ministry of Finance, which may offset 
them against obligations existing in its favor.”
33 Croatia is a second example, “obligations of 
the Croatian National Bank shall be guaranteed by the Republic of Croatia.” The Act on the 
Central Bank of Iceland states that “All obligations of the Central Bank are guaranteed by the 
State Treasury.” 
                                                 
33 This provision dates from the era prior to the full dollarization of the Salvadorian economy and the 
elimination of the national currency.  19   
 
A very different sentiment is expressed in a number of countries where the law explicitly 
states that, in general, the central bank is not responsible for the liabilities of the state and the 
state is not responsible for the liabilities of the central bank. One interesting commonality in 
this respect can be perceived in a number of the laws in the countries comprising Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. This could be the result 
of the fact that most of the laws date from a similar era when this was deemed to be an 
important feature of central bank independence; the particular political and economic 
realities shared by those countries at the time; or a peculiarity of the distribution of state 
assets and liabilities following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
 
If one takes, for example, the Law on the Bank of Lithuania, it stands in stark contrast with 
the notion that the government stands behind the central bank and vice versa. “The State of 
Lithuania shall not be liable for the obligations of the Bank of Lithuania, and the Bank of 
Lithuania shall not be liable for the obligations of the State of Lithuania.” Similarly, the law 
on the National Bank of Tajikistan: “The Republic of Tajikistan shall not be liable for the 
obligations of the National Bank of Tajikistan, except for those assumed with consent of the 
Madjlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan or the President of the Republic of Tajikistan.” 
 
Although most central bank laws are not explicit on this issue, the review summarized above 
and provided in Appendix 1 shows that it cannot be assumed that the state is legally 
responsible for the central bank’s obligations which suggests that the latter’s independent 
financial strength is a consideration when considering its ability to fulfill its mandate. 
 
B.   Coping with Central Bank Losses or Capital Insufficiency 
Indirect responsibility for central bank liabilities can be inferred from provisions in the 
central bank law governing how central bank losses or capital insufficiency would be 
addressed. Many central bank laws have such provisions although the procedures are defined 
with different levels of specificity. 
  20   
Some countries have general clauses, such as Kuwait “If the General Reserve Fund, in any 
years, is insufficient to meet the losses of the Bank, or if it can not be used to meet the losses, 
the Government shall cover the deficit.” A slightly more specific phrase can be found in the 
Bank of Korea Act: “Any loss incurred by the Bank of Korea during any fiscal year shall be 
offset from the reserves and, should these be insufficient, the deficiency shall be made-up by 
the Government in accordance with the Budget and Accounts Act.” 
 
The Bank of Korea Act points to the potential issue of requiring further legislative approval 
for a recapitalization, for instance through the annual budgetary process. Some country laws 
specify that further approval is not necessary and hence appear to be closer to “automatic” 
recapitalization. Take the Central Bank of Kenya Act: “The amount of any net losses of the 
Bank in any financial year which is in excess of the sums standing to the credit of the general 
reserve fund of the Bank shall be charged upon and paid out of the Consolidated Fund 
without further appropriation than this Act.” 
 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act specifies particular losses that are to be covered by 
Government reflecting the particular agency arrangement the latter has with the former 
regarding the management of the country’s foreign exchange reserves: “The Minister shall, 
without further appropriation, pay to the Bank out of the Crown Bank Account the amount of 
any exchange losses (whether realized or unrealized) incurred by the Bank as a result of 
dealing in foreign exchange under sections 17 and 18 of this Act”. 
 
How the losses are covered can be as important as when. Some central bank laws specify the 
type of transfer that is to be received. In Cape Verde: “If the Bank incurs a net loss...[it] shall 
be applied to the General Reserves, and if the latter should prove insufficient...the balance of 
the loss should be transferred to unappropriated earnings; After the submission, by the Bank, 
of a report...confirming the balance of the cumulative losses, the Government shall deliver to 
the Bank, within a maximum period of 60 days, funds, negotiable instruments that are dated 
and on market-determined terms and conditions and at market-determined exchange rates, in 
the amount or amounts necessary to make up the deficit.” 
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In other countries the law specifically calls for the provision of securities of a very different 
and/or more ambiguous nature. In Fiji “The Minister...shall cause to be transferred to the 
ownership of the Reserve Bank non-negotiable non-interest bearing securities issued by the 
Government ...for the purpose of preserving the paid-up capital from any impairment...” In 
Malawi, “...any devaluation losses shall be covered by promissory notes of the government 
on such terms and conditions as shall be agreed upon between the Minister and the Bank.” 
The Bank of Namibia Act calls for revaluation losses to be covered by “...non-negotiable 
securities to the extent of the deficiency, on such terms and conditions as the Minister and the 
Board may agree upon.” The Central Banking Act in Papua New Guinea states that the 
Minister may create and issue to the Central Bank “non-interest bearing non-negotiable notes 
for an amount not exceeding any payment made by the Minister to the Central Bank out of 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund.” 
 
In some cases the securities are to be serviced out of future central bank profits, such as 
United Arab Emirates “...the Government shall cover it [net debit balance] by issuing non-
interest bearing, negotiable Treasury Bonds, which shall in turn be returned out of any net 
profits realized in subsequent years.” In Rwanda “...the Government will issue Treasury Bills 
not negotiable and non interest-bearing, for an amount equivalent to the debit balance of 
revaluation account. These Treasury Bills will be refundable by deduction from the 
Government share of Bank profits according to a schedule agreed upon with the Minister 
having finances under their competency.” 
 
V.   DO TREASURIES ACTUALLY STAND BEHIND CENTRAL BANKS? 
The basic answer to this question is frequently no, at least not on a timely basis. 
 
Examples of this phenomenon abound with the motivations/rationales falling into several 
different categories. One is that some states simply do not fulfill their legal obligations.  22   
Jácome and Parrado (2007) note that “In practice, this legal mandate has not materialized in 
the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua...”
34 
 
A second reason is that although the law might provide in general terms for the necessity of a 
recapitalization, the actual transfer of resources from the treasury would usually require 
legislative approval. That is, as most countries require legislative approval to spend public 
funds, a general commitment to maintain the capital of a public enterprise cannot override a 
requirement that the legislature specifically authorize such an expenditure prior to its 
occurrence. 
 
In some laws, this notion is recognized explicitly, e.g., in Guatemala the central bank law 
calls for the Minister of Finance to submit, within the subsequent year’s budget request, the 
amount necessary to recapitalize the central bank.
35 It does not, and seemingly could not, 
mandate a future congress to authorize the requested expenditure whatever the amount, 
whenever it occurs and for whatever the reason. Foreseeing possible future fiscal problems, 
the Central Bank of Venezuela law (2001) states that if fiscal resources are not sufficient to 
provide a budget allocation to make up for losses, the National Assembly shall authorize a 
special issue of national public debt under market conditions to do so (see Table 4).  
 
Third, as suggested by the review of law in Section IV, central banks have frequently been 
“recapitalized” with treasury obligations with virtually no value. The Central Bank of 
Honduras (BCH) has been “capitalized” three times with nonremunerated long-term debt.
36 
 
At its founding, in 1950 the BCH received a 50 year non-remunerated government bond to 
cover its newly mandated monetary liabilities to the extent that these exceeded the assets of 
                                                 
34 The Quest for Price Stability in Central America and the Dominican Republic, Luis I. Jácome and 
Eric Parrado, IMF Working Paper, WP/07/54, page 6. 
35 This replaced Article 83 of the old Central Bank of Guatemala law which stated that the State, through the 
Ministry of Finance, shall absorb the accumulated cost of monetary, exchange rate and credit policies through 
the emission of long term public debt with an interest rate of zero (author’s translation). 
 
36 See Stella (2008a).   23   
the monetary board that it replaced. Interestingly the government never used its own 
resources to redeem the bond. The 1996 amendments to the central bank law required the 
central bank to redeem the bond out of its own reserves. In 1997, the BCH received another 
50 year non-remunerated bond to cover its accumulated losses as of end-1996. The nominal 
value was 5.4 billion lempira, equivalent to 1.1 percent of 1996 GDP. However, valuing a 
payment of 5.4 billion lempira to be received in 2047 at 1997 prices using as a discount rate 
the average return on Honduran government bonds during the period 1997–2003 yields a 
value of 0.0006 percent of GDP. In 2005, the BCH received a third non-remunerated 50-year 
bond, with 25 years grace, to cover losses accumulated during the years 1997–2003. 
 
A not infrequent technique is to provide the central bank with a security the debt service on 
which is to be paid out of the central bank’s own retained earnings. Taking this security at an 
arbitrary par value may allow the treasury to meet its obligation under the law but provides 
neither an asset under IFRS nor any positive cash flow in the immediate future.
37 
 
Central banks highly exposed to foreign exchange fluctuations are particularly prone to 
decapitalization from a mechanical asymmetric profit transfer rule. Profit transfers in years 
with significant revaluation gains are not balanced by years in which large revaluation losses 
are suffered since there often is no provision for treasury coverage in that eventuality. 
Considerations such as these recently led the Netherlands to amend the central bank dividend 
policy. 
 
Legal provisions determining when and how profits are transferred to the treasury can be 
exceptionally important. In this respect most central banks pay a mechanical proportion of 
profit to the treasury on an annual basis. Many laws are silent as to how to treat losses, 
leaving the central bank prone to decapitalization. There are no recognized standards for 
central bank capital, nor is the Basel risk-weighted asset to capital ratio applied.
38 
                                                 
37 There is an imbedded option value similar to that with tax losses carried forward. 
38 The Fed is extremely unusual in that it calculates and transfers to the U.S. Treasury profits on a weekly basis. 
Owing to revaluation losses on its admittedly small foreign reserve holdings, it has registered a loss (for a week) 
occasionally.  24   
 
How can central banks run consistent losses but continue to show positive capital? It is quite 
common in central bank laws to have a mandated nominal capital for the central bank. In 
addition to this statutory capital it is also customary to have a reserve account(s). Equity 
would normally be considered to be the sum of capital and reserves. Most commonly, 
reserves are accumulated from retained earnings. If we presume that reserves cannot go 
below zero as a lower bound, there are three basic ways in which central banks can sustain 
losses in excess of equity yet continue to show positive capital. 
 
The first point to recognize is that most central banks have not fully implemented IFRS, in 
particular, fair market valuation of assets. Thus the accounting system may allow the non 
recognition of losses through the use of historical cost of acquisition for valuation. This 
practice was widespread also in commercial banking before recent changes in worldwide 
accounting best practice. For central banks, the original motive was consistent with a desire 
not to distribute unrealized gains on assets to the government as that is akin to monetary 
financing. A number of central banks continue to account for gold at cost of acquisition. 
 
The second method is the use of revaluation or adjustment accounts which do not impact 
equity. This accounting can either be mandated in law or be permitted by the accounting 
policies followed by the bank. A number of countries utilize such revaluation accounts which 
were originally conceived as protecting the central bank from being forced to distribute 
unrealized gains. This is a variant of the first principle—one recognizes the revaluation but 
does not take it into the profit and loss account. Hence large changes in real net worth are 
reflected in the asset or liability revaluation accounts but do not impact equity. 
 
Sometimes the motivation for this treatment is out of a commitment to the law. If the law 
states that capital must be a certain nominal figure, it could be deemed illegal for the Board 
or chief accountant to adjust this figure. The only way to make the balance sheet balance is 
then to take the accumulated losses on to the asset side of the balance sheet. (Rather than 
lowering capital, a liability, below the legal minimum one creates instead an “asset” of rather  25   
dubious value).
39 Sometimes this asset is noted on the balance sheet as a claim on 
government—regardless of whether the government recognizes it at such. Obviously the 
central bank is not in a position to dictate terms on such an asset and invariably it is not 
serviced on time and in full by government. In other cases, there may be a legal remedy for 
the central bank that establishes its claim on government for accumulated losses and 
eventually the bank is provided real assets as part of a recapitalization at some distant point 
in the future. 
 
One example of the use of revaluation accounts was the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) 
before its recapitalization. Revaluation losses by end-1995 had reached 37 percent of central 
bank assets, far in excess of capital (see Table 2).
40 Despite these large revaluation losses the 
NBH continued to transfer profit to the Ministry of Finance.
41 
 
Table 2. Hungary: Central Bank Balance Sheet as of December 31, 1995 
 
(In billions of forints) 
 
Foreign exchange 1,805    2,906    Non-resident deposits and other liabilities
Credit to government 1,130    1,466    Resident deposits
Credit to financial institutions, other credit and 
specific provisions
287       482       Banknotes and coins
Revaluation losses 2,033    182       IMF claims
Other assets 166       152       Blocked foreign exchange deposits of government
177       Other liabilities
55         Balance sheet profit, authorized capital and provisions




Source: National Bank of Hungary Annual Report 1995, Statistical Annex, pages 224–25. 
 
                                                 
39 At the Central Bank of Ecuador such assets were known in the 1990s as “perdidas activadas” which translates 
roughly as “assetized losses.” 
 
40 In South Africa (2003) and Peru (1988), similar accounts reached 28 percent and 25 percent of total central 
bank assets, respectively. 
41 See NBH Annual Report 1995, Section V, “Resolutions by the General Meeting.”  26   
VI.   CAN CENTRAL BANK FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE BE PRESERVED? 
In many cases the exposure of the central bank to losses comes primarily from its role in 
putting its capital at risk by intervening in a systemic crisis to provide liquidity to financial 
institutions and/or their depositors and other creditors.
42 Whether central banks should do so 
is another matter and indeed there are good reasons for central banks to avoid this and other 
“quasi-fiscal” activities.
43 Given that government financial responsibility for such operations 
is often slow to be assumed, outright prohibition of them may be the best course of action to 
preserve independence. This has led some countries to restrict or limit the central bank’s 
ability to be involved in such operations. For example, the central bank law enacted in Peru 
in 1992 expressly prohibited the activities that had been associated with the hyperinflation of 
the late 1980s. 
 
In the case of Peru just described, and in others, changes in legal arrangements reflected 
broader political changes and those, of course, could be reversed. However, presuming an 
underlying consensus for independence, legislatures may enable central bank independence 
for a reasonable period of time, for example three to five years, under most reasonable 
circumstances. Broaddus and Goodfriend (1996)
44 discuss the U.S.: “Congress has long 
recognized, however, that the pressure of budgetary politics could tempt future Congresses to 
press the Fed at least implicitly to help finance federal expenditures through inflationary 
monetary policy. Consequently, the Fed has been made financially independent—its 
operations are funded from the interest payments on its portfolio of securities—and the Fed 
has wide discretion over the assets it holds.” 
 
The current financial structure of the Fed thus obviates the need to be overly concerned about 
its financial strength or with provisions to ensure it beyond the Treasury guarantee of Federal 
                                                 
42 Apart from explicit liquidity intervention in crisis situations, many central banks hold significant off-balance 
sheet contingent liabilities in the form of daylight overdrafts in the inter-bank payments system. 
43 MacKenzie and Stella (1996). 
44 J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr., and Marvin Goodfriend “Foreign Exchange Operations and the Federal Reserve,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 82/1 Winter 1996.  27   
Reserve Notes. The U.S. does, however, explicitly recognize contingent liabilities to other 
financial institutions. One example of this is the capital obligation of the U.S. to the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, commonly known as the World Bank. 
 
The World Bank has both paid in and callable capital but most lending is financed with funds 
borrowed in international capital markets. Should the Bank be unable to cover credit losses 
with its capital and retained earnings, members are committed to pay in further capital to 
avoid a default on outstanding Bank bonds. “Over and above the $2 billion in capital that the 
United States has already paid in, the country has agreed to pay in another $30 billion in 
callable capital should such an event materialize....The Congress has appropriated about 




While the prospect of the U.S. being required to provide more than $7.4 billion in callable 
capital to the World Bank is quite improbable, the U.S. approach bears a resemblance to that 
discussed above in the cases of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of Kenya—a 
legislatively delegated budgetary authorization for central bank recapitalization. 
 
With these examples in mind we might posit three “stages” or “layers” of central bank 
financial independence (see Table 3). The first being capital on hand, that is, the current 
strength of the balance sheet represented by equity properly valued. The central bank could 
exhaust this equity without any outside involvement. 
 
The second would be a legislatively pre-authorized transfer of liquid funds to cover specified 
losses or a general remedy for capital deficiency. To activate this stage would require a 
technical decision or judgment by the treasury, but not an act of the legislature. 
 
                                                 
45 The Costs and Budgetary Treatment of Multilateral Financial Institutions’ Activities, statement of 
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office, before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, United States Senate, May 19, 2004.  28   
A third stage would be a specific legislative commitment—without pre-authorized budgetary 
authority—to cover a larger capital deficiency. To activate this stage would require both 
treasury consent and budgetary approval by the legislature (in the form of a budgetary 
appropriation). 
 
Table 3. Layers of Central Bank Capitalization 
 
Stage 1  Balance sheet capital; adequate treasury/central bank fiscal relations established; 
restriction of quasi-fiscal operations 
Stage 2  Legislated pre-authorization of recapitalization under certain circumstances 
Stage 3  Legislative requirements that budgetary authority be sought for recapitalization 
under certain circumstances 
 
The U.S. and Canada are cases where the strength of the central bank balance sheet 
eliminates the need for explicit consideration of stages 2 and 3. Many countries have a 
stage 3 solution in place, but, to the authors’ knowledge, only Malawi, New Zealand and 
Kenyan legislation have elements of stage 2. What some countries do have, however, either 
formally or informally, is a mechanism to suspend profit transfers when the balance sheet is 
in some sense deemed inadequate, e.g., equity is negative. In others, the profit transfer is 
negotiated or agreed with the Ministry of Finance depending both on the central bank’s and 
Ministry’s financial need at the time. 
 
The problem with implementing these solutions is that there is no agreed technical trigger 
indicating central bank capital inadequacy—nor can there be. As the real issue is not 
technical insolvency but policy solvency and its credibility, the appropriate degree of central 
bank financial strength is both policy-dependent and a political issue. However, once an 
appropriate level or range in a given country, at a given time, is determined, institutional 













Appendix I.  Is the Central Bank Responsible for the State’s Obligations, and Vice Versa? 
 
Table 4. Results of the Review of Central Bank Legislation 
Country  Title and Date  Reference in the Law  Text 
(Note: In countries indicated by an asterisk, either the state is explicitly free from the obligation to cover central bank losses; or the state has the power to determine the 
terms of any compensation; or such compensation is explicitly restrictive in some way (e.g., instruments provided are unremunerated, non-tradable, or both). 
Argentina *  Law No. 24,144 Charter of the 
Reserve Bank of the Argentine 
Republic, amended as of March 
2002 
Article 38.  Profits not capitalized will be utilized for the general reserve fund and the special reserve 
funds until those funds reach 50 percent of the capital of the bank. Once that level is reached, 
profits not retained in capital will be freely transferred to the account of the national 
government. 
 
Losses made by the bank in a given year will be charged against reserves that were constituted 
in previous years and if they are insufficient they will be charged against capital. In those 
cases, the bank board will be able to direct following year profits to reconstitute the level of 
capital and reserves that existed prior to the loss. 
Armenia *  The Republic of Armenia Law 
on the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Armenia, as of 
Dec. 28, 2005 
Article 1. The Central Bank 
of the Republic of Armenia 
6. The Central Bank and the Government of the Republic of Armenia shall bear no 
responsibilities for their respective obligations if not assumed such. 
Belgium *  Constitution of Belgium of 
1970 
Section II - Share capital and 
rights attaching to shares. 
Article 10. 









Table 4. Results of the Review of Central Bank Legislation 
Country  Title and Date  Reference in the Law  Text 
(Note: In countries indicated by an asterisk, either the state is explicitly free from the obligation to cover central bank losses; or the state has the power to determine the 
terms of any compensation; or such compensation is explicitly restrictive in some way (e.g., instruments provided are unremunerated, non-tradable, or both). 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Law on the Central Bank of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
amended as of March 7, 2003 
Article 29. Coverage of 
shortfalls in capital of the 
Central Bank 
Whenever:   
a. on a quarterly pro-forma (un-audited) balance sheet of the Central Bank prepared pursuant 
to Article 64 the value of its assets falls below the sum of its liabilities and its unimpaired 
authorized capital, or  
b. the net profit of the Central Bank for any financial year is insufficient to increase the 
authorized capital of the Central Bank to a level equivalent to five percent of the aggregate 
amount of monetary liabilities (as defined by Article 32) shown on the balance sheet of the 
Central Bank for the end of that financial year, the Ministry responsible for the budget of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall, within two months after submission of that balance sheet to the 
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provide Convertible Marka in such amount or amounts 
as shall be necessary to remedy this deficit. 
      Article 30. Restrictions on 
allocation of net profit 
No transfer, redemption or payment pursuant to Article 27 or 28 shall be made if, as a result 
thereof, in the opinion of the Governing Board of the Central Bank, the assets of the Central 
Bank would be less than the sum of its liabilities and unimpaired capital and reserves. 
Cape Verde  Organic Law of the Bank of 
Cape Verde of May 29, 2002 
Article 57 - (Income for the 
Year) 
8. If the Bank incurs a net loss during any financial year: 
(a) This loss shall be applied to the General Reserve, and if the latter should prove insufficient 
to cover the total amount of the loss, the balance of the loss should be transferred to 
unappropriated earnings; 
(b) After the submission, by the Bank, of a report or statement confirming the balance of the 
cumulative losses, the Government shall deliver to the Bank, within a maximum period of 60 
days, funds, negotiable instruments that are dated and on market-determined terms and 
conditions and at market-determined exchange rates, in the amount or amounts necessary to 
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China  Law of the People's Republic 
of China on the People's Bank 
of China (12/27/2003) 
Article 38  The People's Bank of China shall have an independent budget arrangement. Its budget shall be 
reviewed by the fiscal authority and become part of the central government budget. Its 
execution is subject to the supervision of the fiscal authority under the State Council.  
      Article 39  The People's Bank of China [shall] surrender to the central budget its net profit each 
accounting year after making general provisions at a level set by the fiscal authority. Losses of 




Law 005/2002 of May 7, 2002 
on the Establishment, 
Organization, and Operations 
of the Central Bank of the 
Congo 
Article 52  The government shall be liable for net losses sustained by the Bank if, at any time, the general 
reserve account and the special reserve accounts are depleted. 
Croatia  Law on the Croatian National 
Bank, new law enacted on 
April 5, 2001 
Article 1. Subject Matter of 
the Law 
 
Article 53. Allocation of 
Surplus and Coverage of 
Losses 
(2) Obligations of the Croatian National Bank shall be guaranteed by the Republic of Croatia. 
 
 
(5) Any shortfall between income and expenditures that cannot be covered from general 









Table 4. Results of the Review of Central Bank Legislation 
Country  Title and Date  Reference in the Law  Text 
(Note: In countries indicated by an asterisk, either the state is explicitly free from the obligation to cover central bank losses; or the state has the power to determine the 
terms of any compensation; or such compensation is explicitly restrictive in some way (e.g., instruments provided are unremunerated, non-tradable, or both). 
Dominican 
Republic * 
Dominican Republic - 
Monetary and Financial Law 
No. 183-2 of December 3, 2002 
Article 16. Net Worth, 
Accounting, and Financial 
Statements System 
When a deficit is generated [in a fiscal year], it shall be covered first by debiting the General 
Reserve Fund. If this is not sufficient to cover the deficit, the Government shall absorb the 
difference by a transfer of funds to the Central Bank or by issuing a Treasury Bill, whose 
maturity shall not exceed one (1) year, for the total amount of the difference, at an interest rate 
that may not be less than the market interest rate. This Treasury Bill may be broken up by the 
Central Bank in order to trade it on the secondary market. The Government shall include the 
payment of this Bill in its budget the year after it is issued. 
      Article 82. Debts and 
operational deficit 
The government will fully cover the cumulative deficit of the Central Bank, debts of the public 
sector with the Central Bank existing when this Law comes into force, and losses generated as 
a result of application of Article 84 of this Law, either by issuing bonds in local currency with 
a maturity of at least fifty (50) years, or by allocating funds obtained by the government 
through long-term international financing, or through a combination of the two. In the case of 
bond issuance in local currency, the benchmark interest rate will be up to 2 percent, and 
interest will start to accrue ten (10) years after the date of issue. The government will transfer 
such bonds to the Central Bank, within one year from the date on which the Law comes into 
effect. For these purposes, the Central Bank shall present a study to the government, within six 
months following promulgation of this Law, giving details of the items referred to in this 
Article. The government will issue the bonds through decree; their use will be restricted to the 
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El Salvador *  Charter of the Central Reserve 
Bank of El Salvador, Reforms 
of May 23, 1996, amended by 
the Monetary Integration Law 
of 2001 
Chapter II-Assets. Article 7  In no case may transfers be made from the Bank’s capital and reserves, nor from the special 
funds, nor from its net profits or undistributed profits, in favor of public or private institutions.
 
Exceptions to the above shall be contributions to the Fund for the Protection of Bank Officials 
and Employees, and to the Superintendency of the Financial System, as well as contributions 
to the Fund for the Consolidation and Strengthening of Financial Institutions pursuant to the 
Law governing the Financial Consolidation and Strengthening of Commercial Banks and 
Savings and Loan Associations, and contributions relating to Article 6(c) above. [Article 6(c) 
states: any net end-of-year profits shall be assigned in the following order: ...(c) to the State, 
10 percent of profits after deduction of the above] 
      Chapter XV - Transitional 
Provisions. Article 100. 
The State shall make up the Bank’s losses on the operations established in the Law on the 
Financial Recovery and Strengthening of Commercial Banks and Savings and Loans 
Associations, in a manner to be prescribed by the Ministry of Finance. 
Estonia *  Law on the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Estonia of 18 May 
1993, last amendment - RT I 
1999,16, 271 
Article 3. Independence of 
Eesti Pank 
(2) Eesti Pank shall not to be held liable for the financial obligations of the State, nor shall the 
State be held liable for the financial obligations of Eesti Pank. 
European 
Central Bank 
Protocol on the Statute of the 
European System of Central 
Banks and of the European 
Central Bank, amended as of 
June 1, 2004 
Allocation of net profits and 
losses of the ECB - Article 
33.2 
In the event of a loss incurred by the ECB, the shortfall may be offset against the general 
reserve fund of the ECB and, if necessary, following a decision by the Governing Council, 
against the monetary income of the relevant financial year in proportion and up to the amounts 









Table 4. Results of the Review of Central Bank Legislation 
Country  Title and Date  Reference in the Law  Text 
(Note: In countries indicated by an asterisk, either the state is explicitly free from the obligation to cover central bank losses; or the state has the power to determine the 
terms of any compensation; or such compensation is explicitly restrictive in some way (e.g., instruments provided are unremunerated, non-tradable, or both). 
Fiji *  Chapter 210 - Reserve Bank of 
Fiji of 1973, amended as of 
1998 
6. Capital  (5) The Minister, notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, shall cause to be transferred 
to the ownership of the Reserve Bank non-negotiable non-interest bearing securities issued by 
the Government from time to time for such an amount as is necessary for the purpose of 
preserving the paid-up capital from any impairment whenever, in the opinion of the Board, the 
assets of the Reserve Bank are less than the sum of its liabilities and paid-up capital. 
      34. Revaluation Reserve 
Account 
(2) Any net loss arising from any such change referred to in subsection (1) shall be set off 
against any credit balance in the Revaluation Reserve Account and, notwithstanding any other 
provision of this Act, if such balance is insufficient to cover that loss, the Government shall 
cause to be transferred to the ownership of the Reserve Bank non-negotiable non-interest 
bearing securities issued by the Government to the extent of any deficiency.  
Finland *  No. 214/1998 Act on the Bank 
of Finland-Issued on 27 March 
1998 
Section 8. Capital  The Bank of Finland shall have primary capital and a reserve fund. 
The reserve fund can be used for increasing the primary capital or for covering losses, as 
prescribed in section 21. 
      Section 21. Monetary income 
and allocation of profits 
The monetary income accruing within the European System of Central Banks in the 
performance of its monetary policy function shall be calculated and allocated between the 
national central banks in accordance with the provisions of the Statute and the decisions made 
by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. Half of the profit, following 
allocation of the monetary income that has accrued within the European System of Central 
Banks, shall be transferred to the reserve fund. The remaining profit shall be made available 
for use in accordance with the needs of the state. The Parliamentary Supervisory Council may 
decide on use of the profit for other purposes if this is justifiable because of the Bank’s 
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         Parliament shall decide on the disposal of the profit made available for use in accordance with 
the needs of the state. If the Bank’s annual accounts show a loss, the loss must be covered out 
of the reserve fund.  
         If the reserve fund is insufficient to cover part of the loss, the uncovered part of the loss may 
be left temporarily uncovered. Any profits in subsequent years shall be used first to cover such 
uncovered losses 
Ghana  Bank of Ghana Act, 2002 Act 
612 
7. Revaluation Account  (4) Where the profits referred to under subsection (1) are insufficient to cover the losses of the 
Bank in a financial year, the Government shall cause to be issued to the Bank redeemable 
negotiable interest bearing securities to the extent of the deficiency. 
(5) A credit balance in the Revaluation Account at the end of a financial year of the Bank shall 
be applied to redeem the outstanding securities issued under subsection (4). 
      40. Liabilities for issue  (1) The currency cover assets of the Bank shall be available to meet only the liabilities of the 
Bank as represented by the total of the amount of currency notes and coins issued by the Bank 
and are in circulation. 
(2) Where at any time the assets of the Bank including funds in the General Reserve Fund and 
the Revaluation Account are insufficient to meet demands for the redemption of notes and 
coins, that deficiency shall be a charge on the Consolidated Fund. 
Georgia *  The Organic Law of Georgia on 
the National Bank, as amended 
- October 23, 2001 
Article 3. Independence of 
the National Bank 
2. The National Bank is economically independent and shall cover all expenses with its own 
revenue. The National Bank shall not be responsible for the liabilities of the Government of 
Georgia. Likewise, the Government shall not be responsible for the liabilities of the National 
Bank, except in cases when the National Bank and the Government have committed 
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Germany  Bundesbank Act of 23 March 
2002 
Article 42. Issue of liquidity 
paper 
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany shall supply the Deutsche Bundesbank on request with 
Treasury bills or Treasury discount paper in the denominations and on the terms of the Bank’s 
choice (liquidity paper) up to the maximum amount of 25 billion euro. The liquidity paper is 
payable at the Bank. The Bank is liable to the Federal Republic of Germany for meeting all 
obligations arising from the liquidity paper. 
 
2) The par value of the liquidity paper issued shall be entered in a special account by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. The funds may be used only to redeem liquidity paper that has fallen 
due or been repurchased by the Bank prior to maturity. 
Guatemala  Organic Law of the Bank of 
Guatemala, Decree 16/2002 of 
April 23, 2002 
Article 9. Allocation of net 
deficits 
If after covering its operating expenditure, the Bank of Guatemala has insufficient income to 
cover the cost of implementing the monetary, exchange, and credit policy determined by the 
Monetary Board, the resulting deficit shall be applied as follows: 
(a) Charged to the General Reserve account; and  
(b) If the balance of resources or special assets in the General Reserve account is not sufficient 
to fully or partially cover the net deficits, these shall be absorbed by the Government. Within a 
period not exceeding 30 days from the end of the fiscal year in question, the Monetary Board 
shall begin to make arrangements with the executive branch through the Ministry of Public 
Finance for the amount of the uncovered deficit to be included in the draft General Income and 
Expenditure Budget of the Government for the following fiscal year, in which case the 
Ministry of Public Finance shall make provision for covering said net deficits with Treasury 
bills or other financial instruments available to that Ministry, which shall yield interest at 
market rates and be negotiable by the Bank of Guatemala on the national or international 
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      Article 58. Limitation of 
liability. 
When the Central Bank acts as fiscal agent of the government, it shall not assume liability for 
any financial or other obligations derived from the government's failure to pay the principal, 
interest, commissions, or any other commitment, financial or otherwise. 
Iceland  Act on the Central Bank of 
Iceland [adopted on May 18, 
2001] 
Article 1.  The Central Bank of Iceland is an independent institution owned by the State. Its governance 
is subject to the provisions of this Act. 
 
All obligations of the Central Bank are guaranteed by the State Treasury. 
Jordan  Law No. 23 of the year 1971 on 
the Central Bank of Jordan, 
amended as of 1992.  
Article 9. Allocation of net 
deficits 
(d) If the reserves are insufficient to cover any loss in the profit and loss statement for any 
financial year, an amount sufficient to cover the deficiency shall be paid by the Government 
within the first three months following the end of the financial year. Such payment shall be a 
first charge in favor of the Government on the profits which may subsequently be realized. 
Kazakhstan *  Law No. 2155 of March 30, 
1995 on the National Bank of 
Kazakhstan, amended as of July 
10, 2003 
Article 22. The government 
of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the National 
Bank of Kazakhstan. 
The government shall not be liable for the obligations of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, just 
as the National Bank of Kazakhstan shall not be liable for the obligations of the government, 
with the exception of those cases in which it assumes such liability. 
Kenya  The Central Bank of Kenya 
Act, amended as of January 1, 
2001 
9. General Reserve Fund.  (1) The Bank shall establish and maintain a fund designated as the General Reserve Fund, to 
which shall be transferred at the end of each financial year at least ten per centum or any other 
amount as the Board, in consultation with the Minister, may determine, of the net annual 
profits of the Bank after allowing for the expenses of operation and after provision has been 
made for bad and doubtful debts, depreciation in assets, contributions to staff benefit funds, 
and such other contingencies and accounting provisions as the Bank deems appropriate.  
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accordance with this section, shall be paid into the Consolidated Fund.   
(3) The amount of any net losses of the Bank in any financial year which is in excess of the 
sums standing to the credit of the general reserve fund of the Bank shall be charged upon and 
paid out of the Consolidated Fund without further appropriation than this Act. 
Korea  The Bank of Korea Act, 
amended as of 1997 
Article 100 (Recovery of 
Loss)   
Any loss incurred by the Bank of Korea during any fiscal year shall be offset from the reserves 
and, should these be insufficient, the deficiency shall be made-up by the Government in 
accordance with the Budget and Accounts Act.  
Kuwait  Law No. 32/1968 Concerning 
Currency, the Central Bank of 
Kuwait and the Organization of 
Banking Business 
Article 17  (c) If the General Reserve Fund, in any year, is insufficient to meet the losses of the Bank, or if 
it can not be used to meet the losses, the Government shall cover the deficit. 
      Article 48  The Central Bank shall enter in a Special Account the profits realized and the losses incurred 
as a result of altering the exchange rate of the Kuwaiti currency or any foreign currency, or 
altering the value of gold in terms of the Kuwaiti currency, as well as the profits resulting from 
the withdrawal of currency notes and coins under the provisions of Articles (10) and (11) of 
this Law. Credit balances on this account shall not be entered in the Profit and Loss Account 
of the Bank. Debit balances shall be met by the Government unless the Board of Directors 
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Kyrgyzstan *  Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
the National Bank of the 
Kyrgyz Republic of August 6, 
1997 
Article 1.The National Bank 
of the Kyrgyz Republic 
5. The Kyrgyz Republic shall not bear responsibility for the obligations of the Bank of 
Kyrgyzstan. The Bank of Kyrgyzstan shall not bear responsibility for the obligations of the 
Kyrgyz Republic. 
Lao PDR *  The Bank of The Lao PDR--
Law No. 5 dated October 14, 
1994, amended as of October 
20 1999 
Article 34: The methods of 
accounting the Special 
Reserve Account. 
If the Bank of the Lao PDR has any net losses in any financial year arising from any such 
change as stipulated in Article 33 above such losses shall be set off against any credit balance 
in the Special Reserve Account. If such balance is insufficient to cover such losses, the 
Government shall issue to the Bank non-negotiable securities to the extent of the deficiency on 
such terms and conditions as the Bank of the Lao PDR may determine. 
Lesotho  Central Bank of Lesotho Bill 
2000 
20. Paid-up capital of the 
Bank 
(6) Notwithstanding this Act, where in the judgment of the Board, the assets of the Bank are 
less than the sum of its liabilities and minimum paid-up capital, the Board shall notify the 
Minister who shall authorize the transfer to the Bank of funds, negotiable securities bearing 
market-related terms and conditions or foreign exchange for the purpose of preserving the 
minimum paid-up capital of the Bank from impairment. 
Lithuania *  Law on the Bank of Lithuania, 
Law No. I-678 of December 1, 
1994, last amendment - March 
13, 2001 
Article 2. Legal Status of the 
Bank of Lithuania 
 
Article 23. Coverage of the 
Loss and Allocation of the 
Profit of the Bank of 
Lithuania 
4. The State of Lithuania shall not be liable for the obligations of the Bank of Lithuania, and 
the Bank of Lithuania shall not be liable for the obligations of the State of Lithuania. 
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Malawi *  Reserve Bank of Malawi Act, 
Laws of Malawi Chapter 44:02 
adopted in 1989 
5.-  (1) The capital of the Bank shall be three million Kwacha. (2) The capital may, from time to 
time, be increased by such amount as the Board may resolve with the consent of the Minister, 
and the Government shall subscribe and pay up, at par, the amount of such increase; and the 
Government shall ensure that the Bank is kept solvent at all times. (3) The capital shall be 
exclusively held by the Government. (4) The Bank shall create and maintain reserves in 
accordance with section 54 of this Act. 
      54.-  (2) The profit of the Bank shall be distributed in the following order- (b) in the event of a loss 
incurred by the Bank, such loss shall be deducted from the General Reserve Fund and if the 
General Reserve Fund is exhausted, the Government shall immediately cover the remaining 
loss without an appropriation Act being necessary. 
 
(5) Results from any devaluation or revaluation of the Malawi currency shall be posted 
directly into a special account without affecting the Bank's profit and loss account and any 
devaluation losses shall be covered by promissory notes of the Government on such terms and 
conditions as shall be agreed upon between the Minister and the Bank. 
Mongolia  The Bank of Mongolia  
May 13, 2001 
Article 35. Paid in Capital  2) If there is a deficit between the sum of the Bank of Mongolia’s assets and the sum of its 
liabilities and paid in capital, the government shall, within two months of the announcement of 
such deficit by the Bank of Mongolia, take measures to cover the deficit by issuing obligations 
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Namibia *  Bank of Namibia Act, 1997 
(Act No. 15 of 1997) 
31. Revaluation Reserve 
Account  
(2)  (a) Where in any financial year the Bank incurs net losses arising from the change in value 
referred to in subsection (1), such losses shall be set off against any credit balance in the 
Revaluation Reserve Account.  
(b) If the balance in the Revaluation Reserve Account is insufficient to cover such losses, the 
Government shall issue to the Bank non-negotiable securities to the extent of the deficiency, on 
such terms and conditions as the Minister and the Board may agree upon. 
Nepal  Nepal Rastra Bank Act of 2002 42. Allocation of Net Loss:   (2) The loss that cannot be adjusted after making allocation pursuant to sub-section (l), His 
Majesty's Government shall bear the loss. 
New Zealand  Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Act 1989, amended as of 
August 20, 2003 
21. Foreign exchange gains 
and losses 
(2) The Minister shall, without further appropriation, pay to the Bank out of the Crown Bank 
Account the amount of any exchange losses (whether realized or unrealized) incurred by the 
Bank as a result of dealing in foreign exchange under sections 17 and 18 of this Act. 
Nicaragua  Organic Law of the Central 
Bank of Nicaragua, Law 
No. 317 of March 30, 2001 
Article 10.  Losses that the Bank might incur in a particular fiscal year shall be applied to the reserves that 
have been formed in prior fiscal years and, should this be impossible, shall affect the capital of 
the institution. In this case, the Government of the Republic will transfer to it negotiable public 
securities, that will produce interest at a rate equal to the average deposits rate in the banks, for 
the amount necessary to cover the capital shortfall.  
Oman  Central Bank of Oman - Royal 
Decree No. 114 /2000 Issuing 
The Banking Law 
Article 35: Deficiencies in 
General Reserve Fund 
If at the conclusion of any annual accounting period, the general reserve fund is insufficient to 
cover the losses of the Central Bank for the previous year, the deficiency shall be a liability of 
the Government of the Sultanate and shall be paid by the Government of the Sultanate within 
90 days. Any deficiency shall continue to be a liability of the Government until such payment 
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Papua New 
Guinea  * 
Independent State of Papua 
New Guinea – An Act Entitled: 
Central Banking Act 2000 
Article 50. Determination of 
profits and losses. 
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the Loans Securities Act (Chapter 
134) or in any other law the Minister may create and issue to the Central Bank non-interest 
bearing non-negotiable notes for an amount not exceeding any payment made by the Minister 
to the Central Bank out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund in accordance with Subsections (1) 
and (2). 
Paraguay  *  Law No. 489 - Organic Law of 
the Central bank of Paraguay, 
as of 1997 
Article 39. Issuance of 
Banknotes and Coins 
Banknotes and coins issued shall be Central Bank of Paraguay liabilities and shall be 
unconditionally guaranteed by the Government. 
      Article 111. Losses  Any losses incurred by the Central Bank of Paraguay in a given fiscal year shall be imputed to 
the reserves funded in prior fiscal years and if they should be insufficient, they shall affect 
capital of the institution. 
      Article 114.  Restatement of 
the International Monetary 
Reserve 
Earnings resulting from any change in the valuation of assets or the obligations of the Central 
Bank of Paraguay held or denominated in gold, Special Drawing Rights, foreign currencies, or 
in other internationally traded units of account and resulting from changes in the value of the 
Guarani shall be credited to a special account called “Restatement of International Monetary 
Reserves”. Losses or gains resulting from such changes shall not be included in the Central 
Bank of Paraguay profit and loss account. 
 
Losses resulting from prior changes shall be covered by any surpluses in the “Restatement of 
International Monetary Reserves” account. If these should be insufficient, they shall be offset 
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Peru *  Central Reserve Bank of Peru 
Organic Law (Decree-Law No. 
26123) Date of Law: January 1, 
1993 
Article 93.   In the case of a loss, the reserve fund referred to in subsection b) of the preceding article shall 
be applied. If the reserve is insufficient, within thirty days of the approval of the balance sheet, 
the Public Treasury shall issue and deliver to the Bank nonnegotiable and interest-bearing debt 
titles equivalent to the outstanding amount. 
Qatar  *  Law No. (33) of the year 2006 -
Qatar Central Bank 
Article (6)  If the accounts of the Bank show deficit of the capital, the State should issue untransferable 
bonds, without proceeds, to cover the deficit. 
      Article (8)  The Bank shall have a general reserve account to which 10% of the annual net profits shall be 
transferable. The necessary amounts for redemption of the bonds issued in accordance to the 
second paragraph of Article (6) of this law shall be drawn from the remaining percentage. 
Romania  Law on the Statute of the 
National Bank of Romania of 
May 26, 1998, amended as of 
June 28, 2004 
Article 44. Loss coverage  In the event of a loss incurred by the National Bank of Romania during a financial year, the 
loss shall be covered from the available sources in the following priority order: a) special 
revaluation account; b) statutory reserves. 
Russia  *   Federal law No. 86-FZ of the 
Russian Federation of July 10, 
2002, amended as of June 12, 
2006 
Article 2  The State shall not be liable for the obligations of the Bank of Russia, nor shall the Bank of 
Russia be liable for the obligations of the State, unless they have assumed such obligations or 
unless otherwise provided by federal laws. 
      Article 30.  Banknotes and coinage of the Bank of Russia shall constitute unconditional obligations of the 
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Rwanda  *  Law No. 11/97 OF 26/7/1997 - 
Regarding Statutes of the 
National Bank of Rwanda 
Article 45.  Profits and losses resulting from fluctuations of exchange rates are charged to profit and loss 
account of the Bank. However, profits or losses resulting from revaluation of foreign exchange 
holdings and international commitments registered to the balance of the Bank due to a revision 
of foreign exchange system or a modification of the value of exchange rate of franc decided by 
the Government are accounted for in a special account entitled ‘Revaluation Account”, and are 
not considered in the final profit and loss account of the Bank.  
 
The Government guarantees the Bank against any loss that would result from such a 
revaluation.  On Bank requirement, the Government will issue Treasury Bills not negotiable 
and non interest-bearing, for an amount equivalent to the debit balance of revaluation account. 
These Treasury Bills will be refundable by deduction from the Government share of Bank 
profits according to a schedule agreed upon with the Minister having Finances in his 
attributions. 
Sierra Leone  The Bank of Sierra Leone Act, 
2000 
Article 11  (7) If the Bank incurs any net loss during any financial year such loss shall be charged to the 
General Reserve; and if the General Reserve is inadequate to cover the entire amount of the 
loss, the balance of loss shall be carried forward in an account for accumulated losses. 
         (8) The balance of accumulated losses shall be replenished by Government by transferring to 
the Bank funds negotiable securities bearing market-related terms and conditions or foreign 
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         (9) If in any financial year there are accumulated losses carried forward from previous years 
and which losses have not yet been replenished by Government in the manner provided in 
subsection (8), the final profit of that year shall be allocated in priority to the cancellation of 
such accumulated losses. The allocations stipulated in subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) shall 
refer only to the balance of profits which remains after the cancellation of accumulated losses 
carried forward from previous years. 
Serbia  Law on the National Bank of 




The Republic of Serbia shall guarantee for the obligations of the NBS. 
 
The excess of expenditures over revenues shall be covered out of the special reserves, and 
where these funds are insufficient, that excess shall be covered by the budget of the Republic 
of Serbia or by debt securities issued therefore by the Republic of Serbia and transferred to the 
NBS. 
Singapore  The Monetary Authority of 
Singapore Act - Chapter 186, 
amended as of 2005 
MISCELLANEOUS - 38. 
Guarantee by Government 
(1) The Government shall be responsible for the payment of all moneys due by the Authority. 
Tajikistan *  Law of the Republic of 
Tajikistan on the National Bank 
of the Republic of Tajikistan, 
amended as of December 14, 
1996 
Article 1.Legal Status of the 
National Bank of Tajikistan 
The Republic of Tajikistan shall not be liable for the obligations of the National Bank of 
Tajikistan, except for those assumed with consent of the Madjlisi Oli of the Republic of 
Tajikistan or the President of the Republic of Tajikistan; and the National Bank of Tajikistan 
shall not be liable for the obligations assumed by the Republic of Tajikistan without consent of 
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(Note: In countries indicated by an asterisk, either the state is explicitly free from the obligation to cover central bank losses; or the state has the power to determine the 
terms of any compensation; or such compensation is explicitly restrictive in some way (e.g., instruments provided are unremunerated, non-tradable, or both). 
United Arab 
Emirates * 
Union Law No. (10) of 1980 
Concerning the Central Bank, 
the Monetary System and 
Organization of Banking 




Should the General Reserve Account, at the end of any year be insufficient to cover the losses 
of the Bank occurred deficiency shall be met by the government.  
 
3) Should the Account (a foreign exchange revaluation account) show a net credit balance at 
the end of the financial year, said balance shall not be included in the Bank’s profit. Should the 
account show a net debit balance, the Government shall cover it by issuing non-interest 
bearing, negotiable Treasury Bonds, which shall in turn be returned out of any net profits 
realized in subsequent years. 
Uzbekistan *  Law of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan On The Central 
Bank Of The Republic Of 
Uzbekistan No. 154-I dated 
12/21/95, Amended as of 
December 15, 2000 
Article 6. Independence of 
the Central Bank. 
The state shall not be liable for obligations of the Central Bank, nor shall the Central Bank be 
liable for obligations of the state, unless they themselves have accepted such obligations, or 
unless foreseen otherwise by legislative acts. 
Venezuela  Law on the Central Bank of 
Venezuela, amended as of 
September 4, 2001 
Article 72  In the event that the balances in the accounts for undistributed earnings and capital reserves, as 
mentioned in the preceding article, should prove insufficient to cover financial imbalances 
during a fiscal year, the Republic shall be responsible for making the contributions required to 
replenish them. 
 
For the purposes of this Article, such contributions shall be made by allocating the 
corresponding credits in the budget for the fiscal year following that in which the amount 
required was determined. In the event that the fiscal accounts do not allow the budgetary 
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debt securities, under market conditions and with maturity not exceeding five (5) years. 
Zambia  The Bank of Zambia Act, No. 
43 of 1996 
6. Capital  (5) Whenever the Board certifies that the assets of the Bank are less than the sum of its capital 
and other liabilities, the Minister notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law, 
shall, on behalf of the Government cause to be transferred to the ownership of the Bank 
negotiable and interest bearing securities issued by the Government for such amount as is 
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